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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 







Senior United States District Judge
DECISION & ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff commenced this action pro se, asserting that she was discharged and 
harassed in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (the ADA) and New York State 
Human Rights Law (“NYHRL”). See Am. Compl. dkt. # 5. Defendant moves for summary 
judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, seeking to dismiss all of Plaintiff’s claims. See 
Motion, dkt. # 39. Plaintiff opposes the motion by filing only an affidavit with exhibits. See 
Response, dkt. # 41. Defendant filed a reply to Plaintiff’s opposition. See Reply, dkt. #
42. The motion is before the Court based on the submissions alone, all of which the Court 
considers in reaching its decision.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court may grant summary judgment where "there is no genuine dispute as to
1
AUTHENT1CA 
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any material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fe d . R. Civ . 
P. 56(a). A dispute is genuine if the relevant evidence is such that a reasonable jury could 
return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248 
(1986). A party seeking summary judgment bears the burden of informing the court of the 
basis for the motion and of identifying those portions of the record that the moving party 
believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact as to a dispositive 
issue. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
If the movant is able to establish a prims facie basis for summary judgment, the 
burden of production shifts to the party opposing summary judgment who must produce 
evidence establishing the existence of a factual dispute that a reasonable jury could 
resolve in his favor. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 
(1986). The nonmoving party must show, by affidavits or other evidence, admissible in 
form, that there are specific factual issues that can only be resolved at trial. Colon v. 
Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 872 (2d Cir. 1995). “[Proceeding pro se does not otherwise 
relieve a litigant from the usual requirements of summary judgment.” Viscusi v. Proctor & 
Gamble, 2007 WL 2071546, at * 9 (E.D.N.Y. July 16, 2007).
In determining whether to grant summary judgment, the Court must view all facts in 
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, but “only if there is a ‘genuine’ dispute as 
to those facts.” Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1776 (2007). The nonmoving party 
cannot defeat summary judgment by “simply show[ing] that there is some metaphysical 
doubt as to the material facts,” Matsushita., 475 U.S. at 586, or by a factual argument 
based on “conjecture or surmise.” Bryant v. Maffucci, 923 F.2d 979, 982 (2d Cir. 1991). In
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this regard, a party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment may not 
rest upon "mere allegations or denials” asserted in the pleadings, Rexnord Holdings, Inc. 
v. Bidermann, 21 F.3d 522, 525-26 (2d Cir. 1994), or on conclusory allegations or 
unsubstantiated speculation. Scotto v. Almenas, 143 F.3d 105, 114 (2d Cir. 1998). 
Hearsay is also insufficient to create a question of fact on a summary judgment motion. 
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4).
The Local Rules of the Northern District require a party moving for summary
judgment to submit a “Statement of Material Facts” which sets forth, with citations to the
record, each material fact about which the moving party contends there exists no genuine
issue. N.D.N.Y.L.R. 7.1(a)(3). Once a properly supported Local Rule 7.1(a)(3) Statement
is submitted, the party opposing the motion must
file a response to the [movant’s] Statement of Material Facts. The non­
movant’s response shall mirror the movant’s Statement of Material Facts by 
admitting and/or denying each of the movant’s assertions in matching 
numbered paragraphs. Each denial shall set forth a specific citation to the 
record where the factual issue arises. The non-movant’s response may also 
set forth any additional material facts that the non-movant contends are in 
dispute in separately numbered paragraphs. Any facts set forth in the 
Statement of Material Facts shall be deemed admitted unless specifically 
controverted by the opposing party.
Id. (underscoring in original).
The responding Statement of Material Facts is not a mere formality, and the courts 
apply this rule strictly. See N.Y. Teamsters Conference Pension & Ret. Fund v. Express 
Servs., Inc., 426 F.3d 640, 648-49 (2d Cir. 2005)(upholding grant of summary judgment 
where “[t]he district court, applying Rule 7.1(a)(3) strictly, reasonably deemed [movant’s] 
statement of facts to be admitted” because the non-movant submitted a responsive Rule 
7.1(a)(3) statement that “offered mostly conclusory denials of [movant’s] factual assertions
3
and failed to include any record citations.”); Gubitosi v. Kapica, 154 F.3d 30, 31 n. 1 (2d 
Cir. 1998)(per curiam)(accepting as true material facts contained in unopposed local rule 
statement of material facts); Meaney v. CHS Acquisition Corp., 103 F. Supp.2d 104, 108 
(N.D.N.Y. 2000)(deeming movant’s Rule 7.1(a)(3) Statement admitted where 
non-movant’s response “set forth no citations -  specific or otherwise -  to the 
record”)(emphasis in original); McKnight v. Dormitory Auth. of State of N.Y., 189 F.R.D. 
225, 227 (N.D.N.Y. 1999)(McAvoy, J.)(“deem[ing] the portions of Defendants’ 7.1(a)(3) 
statement that are not specifically controverted by Plaintiff to be admitted”); Osier v. 
Broome County, 47 F. Supp.2d 311, 317 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) (McAvoy, J.)(deeming admitted 
all facts in defendants’ Rule 7.1(a)(3) statement where “plaintiff submitted thirteen pages 
of purported facts without any indication where those facts can be located in the record”).
While the Court must construe a pro se litigant’s pleadings and papers liberally and 
interpret them to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest, Govan v. Campbell, 289 
F. Supp.2d 289, 295 (N.D.N.Y. 2003);1 Veloz v. New York, 339 F. Supp.2d 505, 513 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004), application of this lenient standard does not relieve a pro se litigant of 
the requirement to follow the procedural formalities of Local Rule 7.1(a)(3). Govan, 289 F. 
Supp.2d at 295; see also Faretta v. California, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 2541 n. 46 (1975)(”The 
right of self-representation is not a license . . . not to comply with relevant rules of 
procedural and substantive law.”); Edwards v. INS, 59 F.3d 5, 8 (2nd Cir. 1995)(“While a 
pro se litigant's pleadings must be construed liberally, . . . pro se litigants generally are 
required to inform themselves regarding procedural rules and to comply with them.”).
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Plaintiff’s opposition to Defendant’s motion consists merely of an affidavit 
accompanied by certain exhibits. See Response in Opposition [dkt. # 41]. She has 
submitted neither the required memorandum of law in opposition to Defendant’s motion, 
nor the required response to Defendant’s Statement of Material Facts. See N.D.N.Y.L.R. 
7.1(a)(3). Because Plaintiff has not submitted an opposing Statement of Material Facts, 
the properly supported facts set forth in Defendant’s St a t e m e n t  o f  Ma t e r ia l  Fa c t s  No t  
in  Dis p u t e  are deemed admitted for purposes of this motion. See N.D.N.Y.L.R. 7.1(a)(3).
III. BACKGROUND2
Plaintiff Jennifer A. Zurenda (“Plaintiff” or “Ms. Zurenda”) began working for 
Defendant Cardiology Associates, P.C. (“Defendant” or “Cardiology Associates”) on 
December 17, 2002 as a File Clerk/Receptionist. Cardiology Associates is a New York 
professional corporation that provides cardiac medical services to patients in the Greater 
Binghamton area. It is governed by its Board of Directors, which consists of its ten partner 
physicians. Doctor Afzul Ur Rehman is the current president of the Board and Cathy 
Comeno is the clinical manager at Cardiology Associates.
As a File Clerk/Receptionist, Plaintiff was required to do filing, retrieve charts and 
records, and answer the telephone. Her position required her to both stand and sit 
throughout the day, and her filing responsibilities involved standing and bending regularly. 
Cathy Comeno reviewed Ms. Zurenda’s performance as a File Clerk/Receptionist. Ms. 
Zurenda received mediocre performance reviews. These repeatedly noted that Plaintiff 
had the following problems: poor attendance; need for workflow improvement, need for
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5
improvement of morale; need for increased dependability; and need for increased written 
communication. Ms. Zurenda signed each of these reviews, and the reviews occurred 
before Ms. Zurenda left work for her first knee surgery (discussed infra).
In 2006, Ms. Zurenda took a medical leave of absence from Cardiology Associates 
for a neck injury. That leave of absence lasted two to three months. Cardiology 
Associates accommodated Ms. Zurenda’s neck injury by allowing her this leave, and she 
returned to work when it was over.
In 2007, Ms. Zurenda took a six-week medical leave of absence from 
Cardiology Associates for thyroid surgery. Cardiology Associates accommodated Ms. 
Zurenda’s need for thyroid surgery by granting this leave, and she returned to work when it 
was over.
On February 1, 2008, after the resignation of another staff member, Ms. Zurenda 
was assigned to the position of Telephone Operator.3 Ms. Zurenda’s job duties as a 
Telephone Operator were essentially the same as a File Clerk/Receptionist with the 
additional duties of handling patient check-in and check-outs. During the time Ms.
Zurenda was a Telephone Operator, Ellen Smith reviewed her performance. Ms. 
Zurenda’s 2008 annual performance review noted that while she had improved in some 
areas she still needed to improve her productivity and “produce more work in a typical 
workday.” This performance review was signed by Ms. Zurenda, Ellen Smith, and Cathy 
Comeno.
In December 2008, Ms. Zurenda requested and received a medical leave of
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absence for surgery on her right knee. Ms. Zurenda was out of work for six weeks on this 
leave. She returned to work on February 2, 2009. Upon her return to work, Ms. Zurenda 
was allowed to work part time and park in the patient parking handicapped space. Plaintiff 
contends, however, that her part time schedule was not a reasonable accommodation for 
her because she had requested that she work in the mornings only so that she “could do 
physical therapy, chiropractor [sic] and counseling in the afternoons.” Am. Compl. ^ 12. 
According to Plaintiff, she was scheduled to work two afternoons, one of which she agreed 
to work but one of which she did not because she did not have sufficient notice to 
reschedule her appointments. Id. ^ 13. Plaintiff asserts that when she protested, she was 
told: “Either you work, or you don’t have a job.” Jd. ^ 14.
Plaintiff also contends that “[d]uring [this] time period, plaintiff was subjected to 
various demeaning comments regarding her condition by defendant's 
supervisor/management, such as, ‘I could come to work on crutches’[,] as well as 
comments from a doctor who would refer to the plaintiff as his ‘big nigger’.” Id. ^ 15. 
Plaintiff asserts that she reported the doctor’s racially derogatory remark to Ellen Smith but 
was told: “Just shrug it off, it’s a joke.” Pl. Aff. ^ 5. Plaintiff also contends that she sought 
“some accommodation” for her leg, but was told by Ellen Smith to “pull out the desk 
drawer and put [her] foot on that, and that [she] only worked four hours, and that [she] 
could handle it.” Id. ^ 11. Plaintiff does not believe that putting her foot on the desk draw 
“is really an accommodation,” id., but she does not identify what accommodation she 
sought while at work or what accommodation she thought was reasonable.
Plaintiff also maintains that around this time she received an e-mail message 
asking her to fill in for others who could not work on two days. Id. ^ 12. She responded to
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Cathy Comeno by saying that she could work on one of the days but not the other. Id. 
Plaintiff purportedly told Comeno that the reason she could not work on the one day was 
because “it was related to my health conditions, and disability,” but Comeno told Plaintiff 
that she had to work on the date or she would be fired. Jd.
On April 23, 2009, and because of a decline in income by Cardiology Associates as 
a result of reduced Medicare and insurance payments for certain procedures, Defendant’s 
Board voted to lay-off staff.4 After considering a number of possibilities for the staff 
reduction, the Board voted to make cuts from each of the employee groups.
Consequently, Cardiology Associates laid off one nurse practitioner, two nurses, and two 
staff members, including Ms. Zurenda. The people who were laid off were determined to 
be the least effective at doing their job in each employee group. This determination was 
made by the Board by majority vote. None of the office staff, including Cathy Comeno and 
Ellen Smith, participated in or had a say in the vote. Cardiology Associates paid 
severance for the professional employees (the nurses and nurse practitioner). They did 
not pay severance to Ms. Zurenda or to the other medical records clerk who was laid off. 
This decision was based solely on the classification of the employee. Plaintiff was told of 
the decision on the same day.
Defendant asserts that at the time Ms. Zurenda was laid off, neither the Board 
members nor Ms. Comeno were aware that Ms. Zurenda had scheduled another right 
knee surgery in May 2009. Ms. Zurenda asserts, however, that “at the time they ended 
my employment, they knew I was set for more surgery on my right knee. Attached ... is a
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copy of a letter [dated April 13, 2009] regarding the surgery, a copy of which I provided to 
the defendant several days after I received it.” Zurenda Aff. ^ 10. Ms. Zurenda also 
asserts that she was told by someone at Cardiology Associates that she was “not eligible 
for disability [when she had her second knee surgery] because your are laid off.” Am. 
Compl. ^ 19.
Ms. Zurenda is not currently employed, has not been employed, and has been 
unable to work since leaving Cardiology Associates. She has not sent out any resumes or 
looked for any work since leaving Cardiology Associates, and her physicians have told her 
not to look for work because of her knee surgeries, back problems, depression and 
anxiety. Her physicians have never told her when she might be able to go back to work. 
Ms. Zurenda testified on November 8, 2011 that she has had five (5) knee surgeries in two 
(2) years and feels she has not been doing well since these surgeries. She testified that 
her father does her laundry because she cannot carry the basket or climb the stairs, and 
her mother cleans her house because the activities, including bending and standing, 
bother her back. She also needs assistance when she shops. In addition to her knee 
problems, Ms. Zurenda believes she has been diagnosed as bipoloar or schizophrenic 
and that it affects her ability to be around people and work.
Ms. Zurenda has applied for Social Security Disability on two occasions, and has 
applied for and received short-term disability after leaving Cardiology Associates. Ms. 
Zurenda applied for unemployment insurance benefits, but was unable to receive these 
benefits because she was unable to work.
On April 23, 2009, Ms. Zurenda’s orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Battaglia, noted 
in her chart that she was totally disabled until further notice or her next office visit. Dr.
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Battaglia has made that same notation on each of Ms. Zurenda’s visits since that date.
After Ms. Zurenda’s termination, she filed a complaint with the New York State 
Division of Human Rights (“DHR”) that was dually filed with the Equal Employment 
Opportunities Commission (“EEOC”). She later amended her DHR complaint. The DHR 
complaint, as amended, asserts the claims asserted in this action. After investigation, the 
DHR determined that there was no probable cause to believe discrimination had occurred. 
After receiving the DHR’s determination, Ms. Zurenda did not appeal it in state court but 
instead commenced the instant action.
IV. DISCUSSION
a. NYSDHR Claims
To the extent that Plaintiff asserts claims under the New York State Human Rights 
Law (“NYSHRL”) based upon conduct complained of to the New York Division of Human 
Rights, those claims are barred by the NYSHRL’s election of remedies provision contained 
at New York Executive Law § 297(9). This provides that “[a]ny person claiming to be 
aggrieved by an unlawful discriminatory practice shall have a cause of action in any court 
of appropriate jurisdiction . . . unless such person had filed a complaint hereunder.” N.Y. 
Exec. Law § 297(9). “[New York Executive Law § 297(9)] deprives federal courts of 
subject matter jurisdiction where a plaintiff previously elected to proceed in an 
administrative forum.” Chudnovsky v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 2000 WL 1576876, at *4 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2000). Thus, “[o]nce a complainant elects the administrative forum by 
filing a complaint with the Commission on Human Rights, that becomes the sole avenue of 
relief, and subsequent judicial action on the same complaint is generally barred . . . .”
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Moodie v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 58 F.3d 879, 884 (2d Cir.1995).5 “Furthermore, 
once a plaintiff brings a case before the NYSDHR, he or she may appeal only to the 
Supreme Court of the State of New York.” York v. Ass’n of Bar of City of New York, 286 
F.3d 122, 127 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing N.Y. Exec. Law § 298).
Because Plaintiff’s Division of Human Rights complaint was dismissed based on a 
finding of “no probable cause,” the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider 
NYSHRL claims based on the same acts raised with the Division. Jones v. Onondaga 
County Res. Recovery Agency, 2011 WL 1298774, *6 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2011); DeWald 
v. Amsterdam Housing Authority, 823 F. Supp. 94, 99 (N.D.N.Y. 1993). Accordingly, all 
NYSHRL claims asserted in this matter are dismissed.
b. Disparate Treatment Claim Under the ADA
Plaintiff brings a disparate treatment claim under the ADA, asserting that she was 
discharged because of her disabilities. The ADA prohibits discrimination against a 
“qualified individual [with a disability] on the basis of disability” in the “terms, conditions, 
and privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Claims alleging discriminatory 
discharge under the ADA are analyzed using the burden-shifting paradigm articulated in 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Parker v. Columbia 
Pictures Indus., 204 F.3d 326, 332 n. 1 (2d Cir. 2000) (ADA claims are evaluated under 
McDonnell Douglas); Heyman v. Queens Village Comm. for Mental Health for Jamaica 
Cmty. Adolescent Program, Inc., 198 F.3d 68, 72 (2d Cir.1999). Under this analysis, 
Plaintiff first bears the burden of setting out a prims facie case of discrimination. See
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McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. Plaintiff’s burden of establishing a prims facie case 
is de minimis. Beyer v. County of Nassau, 524 F.3d 160, 163 (2d Cir. 2008). If the plaintiff 
demonstrates a prims facie case, that gives rise to a presumption of unlawful 
discrimination and the burden of production shifts to the defendant who is required to offer 
a legitimate, nondiscriminatory rationale for its actions. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. 
at 802-03. Defendant's burden of production at this stage "is not a demanding one,” 
Bickerstaff v. Vassar College, 196 F.3d 435, 446 (2d Cir. 1999), it need only offer a basis 
for the employment decision in issue which, "taken as true, would permit the conclusion 
that there was a nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action." St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. 
Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 509 (1993).
If Defendant proffers a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged 
action, "the presumption raised by the prims facie case is rebutted, and drops from the 
case." St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 507. The burden shifts back to Plaintiff who 
“then has the opportunity to demonstrate that the proffered reason was not the true reason 
for the employment decision, and that [unlawful retaliation] was." Fisher v. Vassar College, 
114 F.3d 1332, 1336 (2d Cir. 1997)(en banc)(internal citation and quotation marks 
omitted), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1075 (1998); see Stern v. Trustees of Columbia Univ. in 
the City of N.Y., 131 F. 3d 305, 312 (2d Cir.1997)(In order to defeat summary judgment . .
., the plaintiff's admissible evidence must show circumstances that would be sufficient to 
permit a rational finder of fact to infer that the defendant's employment decision was more 
likely than not based in whole or in part on discrimination.”). The ultimate burden of 
persuasion remains always with Plaintiff. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 507, 511. In
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determining whether Plaintiff can satisfy this ultimate burden, the Court must examine the 
entire record and apply “a case-by-case approach.” Schnabel v. Abramson, 232 F.3d 83, 
90 (2d Cir. 2000).
To establish a prims facie case of discrimination under the ADA, Plaintiff must show 
that: (1) her employer is subject to the ADA, (2) she is disabled within the meaning of the 
ADA, (3) she is otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of her job with or 
without reasonable accommodation, and (4) she was discharged because of her disability. 
See Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., 386 F.3d 192, 198 (2d Cir. 2004). The second, third, and 
fourth elements, as well as the ultimate question of discrimination, are in dispute on this 
motion.
(1) Disabled within the meaning of the ADA
On the second element of the prims facie case, Plaintiff must present evidence 
demonstrating that she is disabled within the meaning of the ADA. The ADA defines 
disability with respect to an individual as: “(A) a physical or mental impairment that 
substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such 
an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 
12102(1); Buckley v. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., 127 F.3d 270, 272 (2d Cir.1997). “[T]he 
determination of whether or not a person suffers from a disability under the ADA ‘is an 
individualized inquiry’ that does not rest on the mere diagnosis of an impairment.” Bonilla 
v. Boces, 2010 WL 3488712, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2010)(citing Sutton v. United 
Airlines, 527 U.S. 471, 483 (1999)). Instead, courts are to look to “the effect of [an] 
impairment on the life of the individual,” 29 CFR pt. 1630, App. § 1630.2(j), and “[i]t is
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insufficient for individuals attempting to prove disability status . . . to merely submit 
evidence of a medical diagnosis of impairment.” Toyota Motor Mfg., Kentucky, Inc. v. 
Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198 (2002). Regulations promulgated under the ADA define 
“major life activities” to include “functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual 
tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.” 29 C.F.R. § 
1630.2(I); see also Buckley v. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc., 155 F.3d 150 
(2d Cir.1998) (en banc).
To be “substantially impaired” from performing a major life activity, a plaintiff must 
have an impairment that “prevents or severely restricts the individual from doing activities 
that are of central importance to most people's daily lives.” Toyota, 534 U.S. at 197. “The 
need to identify a major life activity that is affected by the plaintiff's impairment plays an 
important role in ensuring that only significant impairments will enjoy the protection of the 
ADA.” Reeves v. Johnson Controls World Servs., 140 F.3d 144, 152 (2d Cir.1998).
Plaintiff asserts that she was disabled from the major life activity of working. An 
impairment “substantially limits” the major life activity of working if an individual is 
“significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of 
jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, 
skills and abilities.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3). “The inability to perform a single, particular 
job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working.” Id.
At the time Plaintiff was discharged for her employment, she was recovering from a 
knee surgery but was working on a part time basis. Although it appears that her mobility 
was limited and she feels that she was not provided some unidentified accommodation at 
work and the part time schedule she wanted, the evidence does not indicate that, at the
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time, she was disabled from the major life activity of working. Plaintiff argues, however, 
that she was scheduled for a second right knee surgery at the time, and seemingly asserts 
that this upcoming surgery would prevent her from working while she recovered thereby 
qualifying as a disability under the ADA. This is insufficient.
“A disability under the ADA ‘does not include temporary medical conditions, even if 
those conditions require extended leaves of absence from work’ because such conditions 
are not substantially limiting.” Huskins v. Pepsi Cola of Odgensburg Bottlers, Inc., 180 F. 
Supp. 2d 347, 351-52 (N.D.N.Y. 2001)(quoting Halperin v. Abacus Technology 
Corporation, 128 F.3d 191, 199 (4th Cir.1997)). “Courts within this circuit and the vast 
majority of courts elsewhere which have considered the question, have held that 
temporary disabilities do not trigger the protections of the ADA because individuals with 
temporary disabilities are not disabled persons within the meaning of the act.” Graaf v. 
North Shore University Hospital, 1 F. Supp.2d 318, 321 (S.D.N.Y.1998); see also Adams 
v. Citizens Advice Bureau, 187 F.3d 315, 316-17 (2d Cir.1999) (temporary neck, back, and 
knee injury lasting three and a half months not a disability); Colwell v. Suffolk County 
Police Dep’t, 158 F.3d 635, 646 (2d Cir.1998) (temporary impairment of seven months 
inability to work while recovering from a cerebral hemorrhage not substantially limiting); 
Murray v. Svsco Corp., 1998 WL 160826, at *8 (N.D.N .Y. Apr. 2, 1998) (holding that a 
knee injury requiring surgery did not have the required duration or long-term impact to 
qualify as a disability under the terms of the ADA). Thus, Plaintiff has not presented 
evidence that, at the time of her employment, she suffered from or had a record of an 
impairment that qualified as a disability under the ADA.
Further, and assuming the decision maker at Cardiology Associates was aware of
Case 3:10-cv-00882-TJM-DEP Document 47 Filed 05/16/12 Page 15 of 23
15
Case 3:10-cv-00882-TJM-DEP Document 47 Filed 05/16/12 Page 16 of 23
Plaintiff’s upcoming second right knee surgery, Plaintiff has not presented evidence that 
would satisfy even the new, more lenient standard for determining whether an individual is 
“regarded as disabled.” See Laurent v. G & G Bus Service, Inc., 2011 WL 2683201, at *5- 
*6 (S.D.N.Y. May 17, 2011).6
Pursuant to this more lenient standard, an employee is “not required to show 
that the disability [s]he is perceived as suffering from is one that actually 
limits, or is perceived to limit, a major life activity.” Darcy v. City of New York,
No. 06-CV-2246, 2011 WL 841375, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2011). Nor 
does the employee have to “show that the employer had a reasonable basis 
for perceiving [her] as suffering from a disability; [the statute] merely requires 
[her] to show that the employer did so perceive [her].” Id.
Davis v. NYC Dept. of Educ., 10-CV-3812 KAM LB, 2012 WL 139255, at * 5 (E.D.N.Y.
Jan. 18, 2012).
The ADAA specifies, however, that the “regarded as” definition of disability 
does not apply to impairments that are both transitory and minor. 42 U.S.C.
§ 12102(3)(B); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(f) (2011) (“It may be a defense 
to a charge of discrimination by an individual claiming coverage under the 
“regarded as” prong of the definition of disability that the impairment is (in the 
case of an actual impairment) or would be (in the case of a perceived 
impairment) ‘transitory and minor.’ ”). An impairment is transitory if it has “an 
actual or expected duration of 6 months or less.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(B).
“Whether the impairment at issue is or would be ‘transitory and minor’ is to 
be determined objectively.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(f) (2011).
Id.
6
[T]he ADA was recently amended by the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (“ADAAA”), Pub.L.
No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008). The ADAAA sets forth a new standard for determining 
whether a person is “regarded as having such an impairment” :
An individual meets the requirement of “being regarded as having such an impairment” if the 
individual establishes that he or she has been subjected to an action prohibited under this 
chapter because of an actual or perceived physical or mental impairment whether or not the 
impairment limits or is perceived to limit a m ajor life activity.
42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A).
Laurent v. G & G Bus Service, Inc., 2011 W L 2683201, at *5-*6 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), adopted by 2011 W L 
2693651 (S.D.N.Y. July 11,2011).
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While the evidence indicates that after Ms. Zurenda was discharged she suffered 
from a combination of conditions completely limiting her ability to work (discussed infra), 
Plaintiff has presented no basis on which to conclude that anyone at Cardiology 
Associates was, or could have been, aware that these developments would ensue. Based 
on Plaintiff’s history of physical aliments and surgeries requiring leaves from work of 
between six (6) and twelve (12) weeks, which includes her first knee surgery, the evidence 
indicates, when objectively viewed at the time of the employment decision in question, that 
Plaintiff has presented evidence indicating only that she was regarded as having an 
impairment that was transitory and minor in nature. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not satisfied 
the second element of her prima facie case.
(2) Otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of her job 
Assuming, arguendo, that Plaintiff could satisfy the second element of her prima 
facie case, she must also present evidence demonstrating that she is otherwise qualified 
to perform the essential functions of her job with or without reasonable accommodation. “It 
is axiomatic that an individual cannot perform the essential functions of a job if [s]he is 
completely unable to work regardless of accommodation.” Henzel v. Delaware Otsego 
Corp., 285 F. Supp.2d 271, 276 (N.D.N.Y. 2003)(collecting cases); see also Mitchell v. 
Washingtonville Cent. Sch. Dist., 190 F.3d 1, 8 (2d Cir. 1999)(“[O]nce estopped from 
arguing he could walk and stand and therefore bound to the assertion that he could only 
do sedentary work, [Plaintiff] could not show that he could perform the essential functions 
of Head Custodian with a reasonable accommodation. He therefore failed to make out a 
claim under the ADA.”). The undisputed evidence in this matter indicates that Plaintiff has
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been totally disabled from employment since her physician excused her from work on April 
23, 2009. Her physicians have not cleared her to return to work, even on a part time 
basis. See Pl. Dep. Trans., p. 7. Plaintiff testified that she has not been able to work 
since that date because of her knee surgeries, back problems, depression and anxiety.
Id. Further, Plaintiff has neither looked for work nor sent out any resumes since April 23, 
2009, and has twice applied to receive disability benefits from the Social Security 
Administration because of her inability to work. Jd. pp. 6, 9-10. In light of these facts, 
Plaintiff is unable to satisfy the third element of her prims facie case.
(3) Discharged motivated by disability 
Nevertheless, and assuming that Plaintiff could establish that she was disabled 
within the meaning of the ADA and otherwise qualified to perform her former position 
either with or without a reasonable accommodation, she must establish that consideration 
of her disability was a motivating factor in the discharge determination. Crediting her 
contention that she was discharged because she was about to undergo another right knee 
surgery, and thus assuming she could satisfy the fourth element of her prims facie case 
on the theory that she was discharged because of the circumstances related to her 
physical condition, the employer has stated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for her 
(and three other individuals’) discharge. Namely, the uncontradicted evidence indicates 
that in the face of an economic downturn, Defendant determined, inter alia, to lay off the 
four least productive employees in each of three employment classifications, and that 
Plaintiff was one of two employees in her employment classification who was laid off.
Thus, the burden is shifted back to Plaintiff to demonstrate that the employer’s
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stated reason is not the true reason for her discharge or that a discriminatory motive was 
involved in the decision. She has not satisfied this burden. Plaintiff has presented 
insufficient evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could conclude that consideration 
of her physical condition motivated the discharge determination. Plaintiff has not 
demonstrated that her prior work performance exempted her from layoff based upon the 
employer’s legitimate businesses-related criteria, or that similarly situated non-disabled 
employees were treated differently than she was treated.
Plaintiff argues that evidence of discrimination is shown by the fact that Cardiology 
Associates hired an individual in August 2009 who performed some of the functions that 
Plaintiff used to perform when her coworkers were on their lunch breaks. However, even if 
Cardiology Associates filled Ms. Zurenda’s position in August 2009, almost 4 months after 
Plaintiff’s discharge, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that this act is indicative of 
discrimination. While the filling of a position by someone outside of a protected 
classification can provide some evidence of a discriminatory motive, here there is no 
evidence that Plaintiff applied for reinstatement or that she could have performed the 
functions of the position in August 2009. Indeed, the evidence is to the contrary, 
indicating that her physician deemed her unable to work in any capacity from April 2009 to 
the present. At most, Plaintiff’s claim of ADA disparate treatment is based upon her own 
feelings and perception of being discriminated against, but such “feelings and perceptions 
of being discriminated against are not evidence of discrimination.” Bickerstaff, 196 F.3d at
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446; see id. at 448;7 Richardson v. New York State Dep’t, of Correctional Service, 180 
F.3d 426, 447 (2d Cir. 1999).8 Plaintiff has failed to provide sufficient evidence from which 
a reasonable fact finder could conclude that considerations of her medical condition 
motivated the employer’s layoff determination.
For the reasons discussed above, Plaintiff’s ADA disparate treatment claim is 
dismissed.
b. ADA Hostile Work Environment Claim
Plaintiff also alleges a claim of hostile work environment under the ADA. To 
establish a claim of hostile work environment under the ADA,9 a plaintiff must prove that 
the workplace was permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that was 
sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and 
create an abusive working environment. Clark County School District v. Breeden, 532 U.S.
7 As indicated in B ickerstaff, on a motion for summ ary judgm ent the Court:
must also carefully distinguish between evidence that allows for a reasonable inference of 
discrim ination and evidence that gives rise to mere speculation and conjecture. This 
undertaking is not one of guesswork or theorization. A fter all, an inference is not a suspicion 
or a guess. It is a reasoned, logical decision to conclude that a disputed fact exists on the 
basis of another fact that is known to exist. Thus, the question is whether the evidence can 
reasonably and logically give rise to an inference of discrim ination under all of the 
circumstances.
B ickerstaff, 196 F.3d at 448 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
8(affirming summary judgm ent for employer where employee offered only her own general claim of 
discrim ination to show that the employer's legitimate reason for term inating her was pretextual)
9The Court assumes, arguendo, that the Second Circuit recognizes a hostile work environment cause 
of action under the ADA. See, e .g., Braun v. Securities Sec. Services USA. Inc., 2009 W L 150937, *8 
(E.D.NY. January 20, 2009)(“Although the Second Circuit has not determ ined whether the ADA gives rise to a 
cause of action for hostile work environment, see Bonura v. Sears Roebuck & C o., 62 F. App'x. 399, 400 n. 3 
(2d Cir. 2003), several district courts in this circuit have held that such claims are cognizable. See, e.g., 
Hendler v. Intelecom USA, Inc., 963 F. Supp. 200, 208 (E.D.N.Y.1997) (analyzing ADA hostile work 
environment claim under the same standard utilized in Title VII cases); Hudson v. Loretex Corp.,1997 W L 
159282, at *2 -3  (sam e).”).
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268, 270 (2001); Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993); Quinn v. Green Tree 
Credit Corp., 159 F .3d 759 (2d Cir.1998); see Hendler v. Intelecom USA, Inc., 963 F. 
Supp. 200, 208 (E.D.N.Y.1997)(analyzing ADA hostile work environment claim under the 
same standard utilized in Title VII cases). A “hostile work environment claim will succeed 
only where the conduct at issue is so 'severe and pervasive' as to create an 'objectively 
hostile or abusive work environment,' and where the victim 'subjectively perceive[s] the 
environment to be abusive.’” Richardson v. N.Y. State Dep’t. of Correctional Serv., 180 
F.3d 426, 436 (2d Cir. 1999), abrogated on other grounds by Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. 
Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 165 L. Ed.2d 345 (2006)(quoting Harris, 510 
U.S. at 21-22). The objective aspect of this test is judged by a reasonable person 
standard. Id. To analyze a hostile work environment claim, the Court “must look to the 
record as a whole and assess the totality of the circumstances, considering a variety of 
factors including ‘the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is 
physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it 
unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance.’” Gorzynski v. Jetblue 
Airways Corp., 596 F.3d 93, 102 (2d Cir. 2010)(quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 23).
The Second Circuit has repeatedly held that ”[i]solated, minor acts or occasional 
episodes do not warrant relief” under a hostile environment theory. Brennan v.
Metropolitan Opera Assn, Inc., 192 F.3d 310, 318 (2d Cir. 1999)(citing Kotcher v. Rosa 
and Sullivan Appliance Ctr., Inc., 957 F.2d 59, 62 (2d Cir. 1992)). “Generally, unless an 
incident of harassment is sufficiently severe, ‘incidents must be more than episodic; they 
must be sufficiently continuous and concerted in order to be deemed pervasive.’” 
Gorzynski, 596 F.3d at 102 (quoting Alfano v. Costello, 294 F.3d 365, 374 (2d Cir. 2002));
Case 3:10-cv-00882-TJM-DEP Document 47 Filed 05/16/12 Page 21 of 23
21
see also Kaytor v. Elec. Boat Corp., 609 F.3d 537, 547 (2d Cir. 2010)(”Isolated incidents 
... will not suffice to establish a hostile work environment unless they are extraordinarily 
severe.” ); Alfano, 294 F.3d at 376 (“the twelve incidents cited by [plaintiff], taken together, 
[we]re insufficient as a matter of law to meet the threshold of severity or pervasiveness 
required for a hostile work environment”); Williams v. Cnty. of Westchester, 171 F.3d 98, 
100 (2d Cir. 1999) (plaintiff must show “more than a few isolated incidents” and that 
“evidence solely of sporadic” discrimination does not suffice) (quotation marks and citation 
omitted).
Plaintiff's hostile work environment claims rest upon allegations that on a few 
occasions she had to work when she did not want to and a few isolated comments she 
found objectionable, some of which are not related to her asserted disability but rather 
have derogatory racial or ethnic connotations. Even considering the events in totality, 
including the non-disability related comments for the impact they had on the atmosphere 
in the office, Plaintiff has not demonstrated sufficiently pervasive or severe harassment 
such to create an actionable hostile work environment. Therefore, Plaintiff’s ADA hostile 
work environment claim is dismissed.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment [dkt. 
# 39] is GRANTED and Plaintiff’s claims are DISMISSED in their entirety.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: May 16, 2012
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